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Designing a Successful Trading Agent:
A Fuzzy Set Approach
Minghua He and Nicholas R. Jennings
Abstract—Software agents are increasingly being used to
represent humans in online auctions. Such agents have the ad-
vantages of being able to systematically monitor a wide variety of
auctions and then make rapid decisions about what bids to place
in what auctions. They can do this continuously and repetitively
without losing concentration. To provide a means of evaluating
and comparing (benchmarking) research methods in this area the
trading agent competition (TAC) was established. This competi-
tion involves a number of agents bidding against one another in
a number of related auctions (operating different protocols) to
purchase travel packages for customers. Against this background,
this paper describes the design, implementation and evaluation of
SouthamptonTAC, one of the most successful participants in both
the Second and the Third International Competitions. Our agent
uses fuzzy techniques at the heart of its decision making: to make
bidding decisions in the face of uncertainty, to make predictions
about the likely outcomes of auctions, and to alter the agent’s
bidding strategy in response to the prevailing market conditions.
Index Terms—Fuzzy reasoning, fuzzy set, intelligent agents, on-
line auctions, trading agent competition (TAC).
I. INTRODUCTION
A
GENT-MEDIATED electronic commerce involves soft-
ware agents acting on behalf of some or all the parties in
e-commerce transactions [20], [22], [33], [42]. Here, a software
agent is viewed as an encapsulated computer system, situated in
some environment, that is capable of flexible autonomous ac-
tion in that environment in order to meet its design objectives
[25]. The rationale for introducing such agents in e-commerce
scenarios is to offer faster, cheaper, more convenient, and more
agile ways for both customers and suppliers to trade. As the
agents represent distinct stakeholders and organizations, the de
facto way in which they interact is through some form of ne-
gotiation. In human negotiations, two or more parties typically
bargain with one another to determine the price or other trans-
action terms [11]. In automated negotiations, the agents pre-
pare bids and evaluate offers in order to obtain the maximum
return for the parties they represent [26]. Such automated ne-
gotiation leads to dynamic pricing which ensures that goods
and services are allocated to the entity that values them most
highly [20]. This, in turn, relieves the merchant of the burden
of a priori fixing the price. In contrast to many human negoti-
ations, automated negotiation can be very fast since decisions
and exchanges can occur rapidly. Automated negotiation can
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also remove the human sensibilities that are often associated
with bargaining. Moreover, complicated negotiation problems
(e.g., those involving many inter-related goods) are often too
difficult for consumers to handle manually. In such cases, auto-
mated negotiation systems can help ordinary users perform like
professional negotiators. In fact, we believe that in complex set-
tings software agents are likely to be more effective than human
bidders (preliminary empirical evidence to substantiate this hy-
pothesis is given in [9]).
Against this background, auctions are one of the most widely
studied and employed negotiation protocols in e-commerce
today [36]. For example, in the Internet Auction List1 there
are currently more than 2500 auction company listings (as
of 2003). Auctions are so popular because they are a very
efficient and effective method of allocating goods or services
in dynamic situations [50]. Moreover, online auctions make
the physical limitations of traditional auctions disappear (e.g.,
time, space and presence), and theyprovide millions of globally
dispersed customers with more varieties of goods that can be
selected within a flexible pricing mechanism [3]. Although
there are millions of different auction protocols [51], four types
of single-sided auction2 are common [48]: English (first-price
ascending), First-price sealed-bid, Vickrey (second-price
sealed-bid), and Dutch (first-price descending). The most
common type of double-sided auction is the continuous double
auction (CDA) [13] which allows buyers and sellers to con-
tinuously update their bids or asks at any time in the trading
period. Moreover, coupling the accessibility of online auctions
with the capabilities of software agents also opens up the
possibility of competing in multiple auctions simultaneously
(either for the same good or for inter-related goods). Such a
strategy has several advantages over participating in single
auctions; for example, it can increase the chance of getting
the good for customers, bring greater profit to customers by
comparing multiple auctions and transacting at the cheapest
price, and make the auction markets themselves more efficient
by ensuring the transaction price is close to the equilibrium
price [39].
Given the potential and the importance of using agents in on-
line auction settings, there has been considerable research en-
deavour in developing bidding strategies for different types of
agents in different types of auctions (see Section V for more de-
tails). Therefore, in order to develop a means of comparing and
evaluating thiswork, it wasdecided toestablish an International
1http://www.internetauctionlist.com
2In single-sided auctions, only buyers or sellers can submit bids or asks. This
contrastswithdouble-sidedauctionsinwhichbuyerscansubmitbidsandsellers
can submit asks.
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Trading Agent Competition (TAC) (similar in spirit to other
initiatives such as RoboCup,3 RoboCupRescue4 and the Plan-
ning Competition5). In this competition, software agents com-
pete against one another in 28 simultaneous auctions in order to
procure travel packages (flights, hotels and entertainment) for
a number of customers (see Section II for more details of the
roles).
The TAC has been set up so that there is no optimal bidding
strategy that is guaranteed to always win. This is because an
agent’sdecision makingintheTACinvolvesuncertaintycaused
by the random features of the game, the opponents’ strategies
and the particular combination of opponents. Against this back-
ground, this paper reports upon the design and implementa-
tion of our particular trading agent (called SouthamptonTAC)
which participated in both the competition in 2001 (TAC-01)
and in 2002 (TAC-02).
SouthamptonTAC was one of the most successful agents in
both competitions (see Section IV) and this paper details its de-
sign and implementation and evaluates when and why it is suc-
cessful. In more detail, SouthamptonTAC is an adaptive agent
that varies its bidding strategy according to its perception of
the prevailing market conditions. It uses fuzzy reasoning tech-
niques to predict closing prices of the auctions, fuzzy recogni-
tion to assess the degree of competitiveness in the prevailing
market context, and fuzzy set technique to control bidding be-
havior. The decision problem in a TAC game aims to ensure
the agent gets the maximum utility at the lowest cost. This de-
pends on many factors given the current environment, such as
the flights bought, the price of the hotel auction, the customers’
preferences,thehotelroomstheagentcurrentlyholdsandsoon.
These factors are usually highly ambiguous. Therefore, fuzzy
set theory provides a good way to handle them. We chose to
adopt a fuzzy logic based approach, in particular, because we
wish to develop a practicable agent that can cope with the un-
certaintiesina timelymannerand fuzzytechniqueshaveproven
to be successful in a wide range of domains with these char-
acteristics (e.g., fuzzy control to drive car-like vehicles [12],
making medical diagnosis [53], vehicle dispatching [46], and
emergency electric power distribution [35]). See Section V for
details of the other alternatives we considered.
This work advances the state of the art in two main ways. In
terms of the TAC itself, we developed novel reasoning models
and prediction methods that enable an agent to bid across
multiple heterogeneous auctions that have interdependencies.
Through the competition and our systematic evaluation this
reasoning mechanism is shown to be both highly effective and
practical (it has to operate in a time-constrained environment
and has to cope with the uncertainty of operating over the
Internet with its concomitant latency problems). In more
general terms, we believe that a number of the technologies
we developed can be used in other complex auction settings
3An international project that uses soccer as a central topic; see
http://www.robocup.org for more details.
4RoboCupRescue is a new research domain which targets search and
rescue in large scale disasters (such as earthquakes); see http://www.r.cs.kobe-
u.ac.jp/robocup-rescue/ for more details.
5The International Planning Competition aims to provide a forum for empir-
ical comparison of planning systems; see http://www.dur.ac.uk/d.p.long/com-
petition.html for more details.
TABLE I
SOUTHAMPTONTAC’S CUSTOMER PREFERENCES FOR GAME TAC-5722. PAD
AND PDD STAND FOR PREFERRED ARRIVAL AND PREFERRED DEPARTURE
DATE.H VS TANDS FOR THE RESERVATION VALUE OF STAYING IN THE
TAMPA TOWER HOTEL, AND WV, PV, AND MV STAND FOR THE UTILITY
ASSOCIATED WITH ATTENDING ALLIGATOR WRESTLING, THE
AMUSEMENT PARK AND THE MUSEUM
and our insights and experiences about building a successful
trading agent will also transfer (see the discussion in Section VI
for more details).
Theremainder ofthepaper is organized asfollows. SectionII
describes the trading agent competition. Section III presents the
details of the SouthamptonTAC agent. Section IV evaluates the
performance of SouthamptonTAC. Section V discusses the re-
latedwork.Finally,SectionVIconcludesthispaperandoutlines
the areas of future work.
II. TRADING AGENT COMPETITION
TAC-01 and TAC-02 involved 27 and 26 agents, respectively,
developed by universities and research labs from around the
world [18], [49].In each TAC trading game, thereare eight soft-
ware agents (entrants to the competition) that compete against
each other in a variety of auctions to assemble travel packages
for their individual customers according to their preferences for
the trip.6 A valid travel package for an individual customer con-
sists of: i) a round trip flight during a five-day period (between
TACtown and Tampa), and ii) a stay at the same hotel7 for
everynightbetween theirarrivaland departuredates.Moreover,
arranging appropriate entertainment events during the trip in-
creasestheutilityfor thecustomers.Theobjective ofeachagent
is to maximize the total satisfaction of its eight customers (i.e.,
the sum of the customers’ utilities). Customers have individual
preferences over which days they want to be in Tampa, the type
of hotel they stay in, and which entertainment they want to at-
tend. This data is randomly generated by the TAC server in each
game (see Table I for an example).
Each agent communicates with the TAC server through a
TCP-based agent programming interface in order to get current
market information and to place its bids. An individual game
lasts 12 min and involves 28 auctions. Each of the three good
types are traded in an auction with different rules.8
• Flights.TACAIRistheonlyairlinesellingflights(placing
asks).Ticketsfortheseflightsareunlimitedandaresoldin
singlesellerauctions.Thereareeightsuchauctions[TAC-
town to Tampa (day 1 to 4) and back (day 2 to 5)]. Flight
6These packages are assembled by the agent bidding in a number of auctions
in which the other bidders are other competition entrants.
7Customers are not allowed to change their hotels during the stay.
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ask prices update randomly, every 24–32 s, by a value
drawn from a range determined by the elapsed auction
time and a randomly drawn value. Flight auctions clear
continuously during the game. Thus, any buy bid an agent
makes that is not less than the current ask price will match
immediately at the ask price. Those bids not matching im-
mediately remain in the auction as standing bids.
• Hotels. There are two hotels: Tampa Towers (T) and
Shoreline Shanties (S). T is nicer than S. Hotel rooms are
traded in 16th price multiunit English auctions. Overall,
there are eight hotel auctions (for each combination
of hotel and night apart from the last one), that close
randomly one by one at the end of every minute after
the 4th. A hotel auction clears and matches bids when it
closes (i.e., 16 rooms are sold at the 16th highest price).
While a given auction is open, its ask price is the current
16th highest price and this price is updated immediately
in response to new bids. The price of other bids, such as
the highest bid, is not known by agents. No withdrawal
of hotel bids is allowed. Suppose the current ask price is
, when an agent submits a new bid, two conditions must
be satisfied for it to be accepted: i) it must offer to buy
at least one unit at a price of or greater; ii) if the
agent’s current bid would have resulted in the purchase
of units in the current state, the new bid must offer to
buy at least units at or greater.
• Entertainment. Each agent is randomly endowed with 12
entertainment tickets at the beginning of the game. All
agents can trade their tickets in CDAs. Overall, there are
12 CDAs (for each kind of entertainment for each of days
1–4). Bids match at the price of the standing bid in the
CDA. An entertainment package is feasible if none of the
tickets are for events on the same day and all the tickets
coincide with the nights the customer is in town. No addi-
tional utility is obtained for a customer attending the same
type of entertainment more than once during the trip.
By means of illustration, Table II gives the market running
state of all the auctions at a single moment in time of the game
in tac-5722. A customer’s utility from a valid travel and enter-
tainment package9 is given by
Utility TravelPenalty HotelBonus FunBonus
where TravelPenalty
(here, and are the customer’s actual arrival and depar-
ture dates), HotelBonus is the bonus if the customer stays in ,
and FunBonus is the sum of the reservation values of all the
entertainment a customer receives. To illustrate this, the alloca-
tions and scores for SouthamptonTAC, given the preferences in
Table I, are shown in Table III. For example, the utility of cus-
tomer 3 is obtained by the following:
TravelPenalty
HotelBonus
FunBonus
Utility
9An invalid travel package receives zero utility.
TABLE II
MARKET STATE OF ALL AUCTIONS IN GAME TAC-5722. THE REMAINING TIME
IN THE GAME IS 6 MIN 42 S
TABLE III
SOUTHAMPTONTAC’S CUSTOMER ALLOCATION FROM GAME TAC-5722. P, M,
WS TAND FOR ALLIGATOR WRESTLING,A MUSEMENT PARK, AND MUSEUM,
AND THE FOLLOWING NUMBER INDICATES THE DATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT
TABLE IV
EXPENDITURE FOR SOUTHAMPTONTAC IN TAC-5722. A NEGATIVE NUMBER
MEANS THE AGENT OBTAINS THE INDICATED AMOUNT OF UTILITY
BY SELLING THE GOOD
At the end of each game, the TAC scorer (on the TAC server)
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optimally. The value for a particular allocation is the sum
of the individual customer utilities (e.g., 10025). The agent’s
final score is then the value of this allocation minus the cost of
procuring the goods. For example, the agent’s cost of obtaining
the goods in game tac-5722 is shown in Table IV. Thus, the
score in this game is .
Designing a bidding strategy for the TAC auction context is
a challenging problem.
• There are interdependencies between auctions. That is,
whatgoods tobuyand howmanytobuyinoneauctionare
relative to the progress of other auctions. These interde-
pendencies exist between different kinds of auctions. For
example, flights will be useless if the hotel rooms are not
availableandifnocustomerstaysinTampaonaparticular
day, the entertainment ticket on that day will be useless.
The interdependence also exists between different dates
within the same kind of auction. For example, customers
must stay in the same hotel during their stay. Thus if a
customer stays in T1,10 the agent will also need to bid in
the auctions of other days for T. Finally, interdependen-
cies exist between the auctions of the same day, same kind
counterpart auctions.11 For example, if the price of T1 is
high, the customer can change to S1.
• The bidding involves uncertainty. For example, flight
prices start randomly and change continuously in a
random fashion and one randomly selected hotel auction
closes from the 4th–11th minute.
• The bidding involves tradeoffs. For example, in flight auc-
tions, if an agent buys all the flight tickets very early, it
may fail to buy the necessary hotel rooms that the flights
require, while the flight prices may be high if it buys the
flights later.
III. SOUTHAMPTONTAC
Our agent design for TAC-01 and TAC-02 is broadly sim-
ilar. However, since SouthamptonTAC-02 built upon our expe-
riences in TAC-01 this is the agent we describe in this section.
The main differences between the two are as follows.
• SouthamptonTAC-02 is an adaptive agent that varies its
bidding strategy according to its perception of the pre-
vailing market conditions (see Section III-C for details).
SouthamptonTAC-01 had a fixed strategy that it used in
all contexts.
• SouthamptonTAC-02 does hotel closing price predic-
tion differently. Although they both use the same basic
technique, SouthamptonTAC-02 has two rule bases
for predicting prices when the counterpart auction has
closed (one for when it has just closed and one for
when it has been closed for a longer period of time).
SouthamptonTAC-01 only had one such rule base (see
Section III-G-I for more details).
10We will use the abbreviation Tn and Sn (1 ￿ n ￿ 4) for staying in the
indicated hotel on a particular day n.
11For the auction of the same day, T and S are called their counterpart auc-
tions. For example, the counterpart auction of T1 is S1 and the counterpart of
S1 is T1.
We now deal, in turn, with each of the main components of
our agent.
A. Classifying TAC Environments
Our post hoc analysis of the TAC-01 competition [23] shows
that an agent’s performance depends heavily on the risk atti-
tude of its opponents. Here, a risk-averse agent is one that buys
a small number of flight tickets at the beginning of the game
and that bids for hotels according to the situation as the game
progresses. This kind of agent is highly flexible and copes well
when there is a significant degree of competition and the hotel
prices are high (see later). In contrast, a risk-seeking agent buys
a large number of flight tickets at the beginning of the game
and seldomlychanges thetravelplanof itscustomers during the
game.Thiskindofagentdoeswellinenvironmentsinwhichho-
tels are cheap. For example, when a hotel price goes up sharply,
a risk-averse agent would stop bidding on that hotel (changing
the stay to a counterpart hotel or reducing the trip period) (see
Section IV-B). In contrast, a risk-seeking agent will insist on
bidding for that hotel, although the price is very high. In so
doing, it hopes that the price will eventually stabilise (hence,
the risk). The consequence of this variety is that for broadly the
same situation, different agents can bring about widely varying
final prices. Based on the analysis reported in [23], we identify
the following types of TAC environment.
• Competitive environments where the prices of the hotels
are (very) high. This is caused by: a) the high bid prices
thatagentsplace;b)thefactthatsomeagentsinsistonbid-
ding for hotels even when their ask price becomes high;
and c) the fact that some agents increase their bids sharply
rather than gradually. For example, in game 4594, the
prices of T (S) are (in the increasing order of day): 5(6),
238(557), 155(102), and 40(11). For most customers in
this game, it is beneficial for an agent to reduce the stay to
a single day (either day 1 or day 4). To achieve this, how-
ever, the agent needs to be flexible. Specifically, it cannot
buy all the flights at the very beginning of the game, oth-
erwise, when the hotel prices rise to high values, it has to
giveupthetravelpackageforsomecustomersorpaythese
high prices for hotels. Being predictive is also important.
By predicting the price of the hotels, the agent can make
alternative plans to cope with the very high prices.
• Noncompetitive environments where there is very little
competition for hotels and an agent can obtain the rooms
it wants at low prices. For example, in game 6341, there
is very little competition and the closing prices for T (S)
are 7(12), 92(27), 70(53), and 62(7). In this situation, the
best strategy is to buy all flights earlier; since the agents
can always get the hotels they want.
• Semicompetitive environments where prices are medium.
There is competition, but it is not very severe. For ex-
ample, in game 444, the clearing prices for T (S) are 5(2),
128(71), 128(60), and 116(3).
B. Agent Architecture
GiventheuncertaintyintheTAC,itis desirablefor theagents
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Fig. 1. Overview of the SouthamptonTAC agent.
of bidding. To this end, Fig. 1 overviews the SouthamptonTAC
agent. The time period from when the agent polls the TAC
server to get the most up to date asks/bids of all auctions to
when it submits its bids to the TAC server is called a round.
SouthamptonTAC connects to the server in a continuous series
of such rounds (the length of a round depends on the location
of the TAC server as well as the server load, but it typically
varies between 2–30 s). In each round, the agent first processes
this ask or bid information in to get the
prices of different goods, number of goods it actually owns
and may possibly own (only for hotel rooms) and its current
active bids. Then, is used to predict the
likely clearing price of each hotel auction (see Section III-G1).
All of this information is then input to which
calculates the optimal distribution of goods to customers given
the current situation (see Section III-D for more details). Given
this assignment, the agent then determines its subsequent
bidding actions. uses updated flight prices
to classify each flight auction according to its expected change
of price and takes the output of to determine how
many trips to bid for (see Section III-E). For example, it may
delay buying the flight tickets if it believes the price change
will be small, so that it has flexibility in choosing the hotel
rooms. takes the ’s output, the
agent’s current active bids, the hotel auction’s ask prices, as
well as the predicted prices and decides whether to increase
the price of its bids or to “withdraw” (see Section III-G2) the
current bids and turn to other auctions (see Section III-G3).
determines the type and the
amount of entertainment tickets to bid for (see Section III-F).
Where SouthamptonTAC differs from its predecessor is in
having an in the architecture. This
component (described in more detail in Section III-C) aims to
determine what type of environment the agent is presently situ-
ated in (as detailed in Section III-A). The reason for doing this
is so that the agent can adapt its bidding strategy accordingly
(see Section III-H).
Among these components, the most important ones are the
, , and .
The aimstodeterminethedegreeofcom-
petitiveness in the environment both before a game starts and
during the course of a game. It does this because the agent will
use different bidding strategies in the different situations. The
is important because it lets the agent
plan about how best to draw up travel plans for the customers.
The isimportant becauseitcanallocatethegoodsthe
agenthasboughttoitscustomersinanoptimalwayandbecause
it highlights what goods still need to be bought.
SouthamptonTAC divides a game into three stages: the
probing stage (up to minute 4), the decisive stage (from minutes
5 to 11) and the finalization stage (minute 12). Hotel auctions
are the most uncertain part of the game. This uncertainty stems
both from the random nature of the customers’ preferences and
from the way opponents deal with their hotel bidding. Never-
theless, a rational agent should have submitted all its hotel bids
before the end of the 4th minute (otherwise, a hotel auction may
close and the agent will miss out on those rooms). Thus, during
the first 4 min the demand of the hotel market is unpredictable.
Given this, SouthamptonTAC uses the probing stage to buy
some flights which it has a high possibility of needing, to place
buy and sell bids in the entertainment auctions, and to place
initial hotel bids. The agent bids for not only what it needs, but
also for extra rooms in the hotels with low ask prices (since
the additional outlay is comparatively small and gives the
agent greater flexibility). As the decisive stage progresses, the
demand of the various auctions becomes clearer and rooms are
actually allocated which means the agent can more accurately
decide which hotels to go for. The finalization stage represents
the agent’s last chance to transact on entertainment tickets and
to buy any remaining flights that are needed. There is no longer
any uncertainty in this stage and so can find the
optimal allocation and the appropriate bids are generated.
C. TAC Environment Recognition
We treat the environment recognition problem as one of
fuzzy pattern recognition since it is impossible to precisely
determine the type while the game is running. To this end, we
therefore apply the maximum similarity principle [37] in the
component of the agent architecture.
This recognition process is used in two cases: before a game
starts and during a game. Before a game starts, the agent
calculates the average hotel closing prices of the previous ten
games12 from the price history and uses the maximum average
price as a reference price to classify the environment in a given
12We chose ten (based on experience of playing the game) as a suitable indi-
cator that is sufficiently stable to not be influenced by atypical game outcomes,
but sufficiently adaptive to respond to genuine changes in the patterns of games.394 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 3, JUNE 2004
Fig. 2. Fuzzy sets of the three environment types.
game. We use the maximum price in this fashion since if one
price is high it is likely that others will also be high and so
the environment is competitive (mutatis mutandis when the
reference price is low or medium). During a game, the agent
continuously monitors the current hotel prices and records the
current maximum price to see if the environment type changes
from its initial prediction. More formally, let represent
on day , and represent the current price if the
agent is monitoring a running auction or the average history
price if it is making its initial assessment of the environment
of . Suppose the prices of and are
and . Then, (the maximum
hotel price) is simply
Let , ,and correspondtothefuzzysetsthatrepresent
competitive,semicompetitiveandnoncompetitiveenvironments
respectively(seeFig.2).Nowthetypeofenvironment canbe
determinedbyascertainingwhichofthefuzzysetsthereference
price has the strongest membership to. Thus, if
then is of environment type , where and
, , and are the similarity functions for the
fuzzy sets , , and . These similarity functions (denoted
) capture how much the hotel price belongs to each of the dif-
ferent environments and they are defined as follows:
.
or
.
.
D. Allocator
The component of our agent operates in two dif-
ferent modes: deals with the allocation of available
and unavailable goods and outputs what flights and hotels to
buy during the first 11 min of a game and does the
same for flights and entertainment tickets in the final minute
when the hotel situation is finalised. By means of illustration, a
sample output from the is shown in the equation at
the bottom of the page. This indicates the agent needs to buy
one inflight ticket on day 1, three on day 2, and two on days
3 and 4; buy two outflight tickets on day 3, and three on days
4 and 5; that good hotels are needed for day 2 (three rooms),
day 3 (3 rooms) and day 4 (three rooms); that bad hotels are
one room); and that the plans for the individual customers are
currently as follows: Customer 1 goes on day 4, returns on day
5 and will stay in the good hotel (1 in third element of tuple),
customer 2 will go on day 1, return on day 4, stay in the bad
hotel (0 in third element of tuple), go to wrestling on day 3, the
amusement park on day 2 and the museum on day 1; and so
on for each of the remaining customers. Both and
use the linear programming package LPsolver13 to
generate their optimal solutions (it never took more than 1 s on
a 1.33 GHz Pentium during all games played).
Dealing first with , in total this has 92 constraints
and 272 variables.14 In more detail, each customer can choose
from inflight day (1–4) and outflight day (2–5) and hotel type
(T or S). This means that in total there are 20 valid packages
for each customer (see Appendix A for more details). Given
8 customers, this leaves 160 combinations (160 variables in
allocators). For each customer, the agent can choose one from
12 entertainment tickets (three types for 4 days). Thus, there
are 96 variables for eight customers. Moreover, there are eight
variables to denote the number of flight tickets needed for each
flight auction and eight variables to denote the hotel rooms
needed for each hotel auction. Since from the 4th minute, one
hotel auction closes, the number of variables decreases from
272 to 264 at the end of the 11th minute. The 92 constraints
come from the fact that: each customer only gets one valid
package (eight constraints), flight tickets/hotel rooms/entertain-
ment tickets allocated must be less than the number the agent
has or is going to buy (28 constraints), each customer can only
use each type of entertainment ticket once (24 constraints), and
13There are other methods that are suitable to model the problem. For ex-
ample, the problem could be formalised as a multiobjective problem using vec-
tors [41]. However, the LPsolver is shown to find the solution very quickly and
is easy to use. LPsolver is based on lp_solve, a simplex-based code for linear
and integer programming problems by M. Berkelaar. The source is available at
ftp://ftp.es.ele.tue.nl/pub/lp_solve/lp_solve.tar.gz.
14Our approach is based on that used in ATTac-2000 [44] but we improve
upontheirmethod. We use only 92constraints whileATTAC-2000has 188 con-
straints. Thus our Allocator greatly improves the speed of finding a solution.
buy inflight buy outflight buy good hotel buy bad hotel
customer customer customer customer
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each customer must use its entertainment tickets between the
days he stays in TACtown (32 constraints).
The deals with the allocation of available and un-
available goods and outputs what flights and entertainments to
buy in the last minute (this solver has 276 variables and 92 con-
straints). The first 264 variables are the same as before, except
that the last 12 variables denote the entertainment ticket num-
bers for each type each day (12 variables). The constraints are
the same as those shown previously.
E. Flight Auctions
The flight price is perturbed every 24–32 s by a value drawn
uniformly from -10 to . The final upper bound (called the
flight’s determinant factor) on perturbations is a random vari-
able chosen independently from for each flight for each
game. The upper bound on perturbations at time is a linear in-
terpolation between 10 and the determinant factor
(1)
where is the time period of a game (720 s) and is not
known to the participants. Fig. 3 shows four different categories
of flights in game tac2-7011 and leads to a number of observa-
tions.First,duringthefirst4minofthegame,thedistributionof
the prices vary in a small range. This is because the current time
is early and time is the dominant factor determining the range
of prices according to (1). Second, the price changes increase or
decrease gradually during the game since time is continuously
changing. Third, at the end of each game, some flight prices
are lower than their initial price (Category 0), some rise slowly
(Category1),some rise quickly(Category2)and some rise very
rapidly (Category3). Here, thedifferences are mainlydue to the
different final bound values of .
Giventheseobservations,we believeit is important totry and
classify the various flight auctions at run-time since this catego-
rization should lead to different bidding behavior. To this end,
our agent observes the changes in prices and puts each flight
auction into one of four categories
determinant factor
(2)
where represents a flight auction, and and are the lower
and upper limits of the flight’s determinant factor, respectively
( and ; and ; and
; and and ).15 We found that although
the increase or decrease is randomly drawn, if is small, the
pricedoesnotrisequickly;conversely,if ishigh,thepricewill
rise rapidly. The agent computes its increase or decrease so far
and classifies each flight. We believe it is unnecessary to find
the precise because even though the increase or decrease is
randomly drawn an that is close to the real “ ” is sufficient to
15These values were first picked based on our experience with the games.
Then, they were tested by a large number of games and shown to produce rea-
sonable classifications.
Fig. 3. Four categories of flight ask prices.
approximate the expected range of change. This categorization
is computed as follows:
(3)
where is the number of timesthe pricechanged in theauction;
is the th price change; and , called the center of ,i s
given by
(4)
where is the time at which the th price change is quoted and
is the time period of a game (720 s).
Formula (3) computes the average price change of the flight
and classifies it into the closest category. However, since the
price change is drawn from a range, whenever is larger than
the upper limit of the range, the flight must belong to a category
with a bigger . For each , the upper limit of the range that
random changes are drawn from rises with time. Thus,
where is the upper limit of the determinant factor of
at time . Then, suppose a flight is currently categorized
as and the current price change is ,i f and
, then flight should be reclassified as .
The flight categorization is updated in each round. Clearly,
as the game progresses the categorization becomes more
accurate (see Section IV-C). However, for most flights the
prices rise during the game. However, if the agent buys flight
tickets very early, it may fail to buy the necessary hotel
rooms (leading to some invalid travel packages). Thus, what
we need is a good tradeoff between buying flights earlier at
lower prices and buying them later to ensure they fit with the
hotels that have been bought. To achieve this, our agent first
needs to decide what type of TAC environment it is situated
in (see Section III-C). For noncompetitive games, the agent396 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 3, JUNE 2004
Fig. 4. Fuzzy sets used in entertainment CDAs. Here b =a is the current
highest bid/lowest ask; b =a is the agent’s reservation price and ￿ =￿ is
the agent’s threshold of accepting the ask/bid. The region with vertical lines
represents the original price acceptance range. Using fuzzy sets, the acceptance
range also includes the region with horizontal lines.
Fig. 5. Hotel prices changes in game TAC2-5960.
will buy all the flight tickets once when the game starts. For
competitive or semicompetitive environments, the agent buys
a number of flight tickets at the beginning of the game (8–10
for competitive and 12–14 for semicompetitive games) because
it knows it will need some flights. Then, when and how many
of the remaining ones to buy of a particular flight is based on
the flight categorization. This delay in buying flight tickets
ensures there is a degree of flexibility. Then, whenever an
auction is sensed, the agent will buy flights immediately.
However, for an auction, it will buy the tickets in the last
minute since the price at the end of the game will be similar
or less than the initial price. An flight will be bought when
the corresponding hotel rooms are guaranteed or the demand
of the hotels involved with the flight is not very high. An
flight is bought immediately after the probing stage. This is
because during the probing stage the expected price change is
quite small (recall rises with time). However after the
probing stage, the increase is more significant (see discussion
in Section III-H for the rationale).
F. Entertainment Auctions
The entertainment CDAs involve two kinds of bids: buys and
sells.Thatis,anagentcanplacebothbidstobuyandaskstosell.
It determines the amount of bids or asks to place as well as the
TABLE V
FUZZY RULE BASE WHEN COUNTERPART AUCTION IS OPEN
TABLE VI
FUZZY RULE BASE WHEN COUNTERPART AUCTION JUST CLOSED
TABLE VII
FUZZY RULE BASE WHEN COUNTERPART AUCTION HAS CLOSED
FOR MORE THAN 1M I N
price of bids or asks. The han-
dles entertainment bidding. A buy (sell) bid will immediately
matchthelowestpricestandingsell(highestpricestandingbuy)
bid thathas a priceat or below(above)theprice of thebuy (sell)
bid. Bids match at the price of the standing bid in the auction.
• Number of buy bids. Place buy bids for a particular cus-
tomer so that the allocation of the entertainment tickets
for that customer is maximally satisfactory. For example,HE AND JENNINGS: DESIGNING A SUCCESSFUL TRADING AGENT 397
Fig. 6. (a) Fuzzy sets of price change. (b) Fuzzy sets for price of Tampa Towers/Shoreline Shanties (T/S).
if a customer will stay for one day, the agent will buy the
tickets with the highest preference value for that day; if
the customer stays for two days, buy tickets with the two
highestpreferencevaluesforeachday,andsoon.Here,the
agent places extra bids to increase the chance of obtaining
a ticket. Whenever an agent is successful in buying a par-
ticular ticket for a given day, it withdraws its buy bids for
that entertainment on the other days.
• Buy bid reservation price. Let be the preference val-
uation of customer for entertainment . The agent only
buysagoodifitcanmakeaprofitfromit,i.e., mustbe
largerthanthepriceofbuyingthatgood.Thus,thebuybid
reservationprice isgivenby:
,where istheprofittheagentcanobtainifthegood
is transacted at . Here, is a decreasing function
with time meaning that the later it is, the lower the profit
the agent is willing to accept.
• Number of sell bids. Sell any unallocated entertainment
tickets16 and any allocated tickets that the agent can get
more profit for by selling rather than by allocating to a
customer.
• Sell bid reservation price. The reservation price is
givenby , where is a de-
creasing function of time and is the preference value
for an allocated ticket and a predefined value for unallo-
cated ones.The lattervalue varies according to theagent’s
context. If it has unallocated tickets, the cost will be at
descending prices (from 80 to 50) meaning that the more
goodstheagenthas,thequickeritwantstosellthem(thus,
the sell price is lower). decreases with time meaning
the later it is, the lower the price the agent is willing to sell
the good for (since selling for a small profit is better than
not selling at all).
16Unallocatedticketsare causedbyhavingmultipleticketsforthe sameevent
or the same day for a given customer or by having no customer staying on the
night of the entertainment.
SouthamptonTAC does not wait until the ask price decreases
toorthebidpricerisestoexactlyitsreservationbuyorsellprice.
Rather, the agent continuously observes the market and when it
finds an ask or bid price very close to its reservation price it will
decrease or increase its ask or bid to match it. For example, if a
bidis79.5andtheaskpriceofouragentis80,itevaluatesthebid
anddecidestodecreasetheaskbidto79.5soastoacceptthebid.
Thisstrategyisachievedusingfuzzysets.Thestrategyissimple
but effective since it avoids missing transactions where the bid
andaskarequiteclose.Fig.4showsthefuzzysetsusedtodecide
when to accept the current asks or bids, where and are
the thresholds of the degree that an agent would like to relax its
constraintsonbuyorsellbids.17 Supposetwofuzzysets and
are characterized by the membership function
and . and are interpreted as the
degree of membership of , (i.e., current asks placed by sellers)
in fuzzy set for each and , (i.e., current bids placed
by buyers) in fuzzy set for each respectively. Formulas
(5) and (6) are the similarity membership functions for bids and
asks.
if
if
if
(5)
if
if
if .
(6)
G. Hotel Auctions
Hotel auctions are the most important, uncertain and diffi-
cult part in TAC. Since customers can have no entertainment
and flights tickets are available throughout the game, only hotel
auctions are uncertain. Moreover, failure in a single hotel auc-
tion can cause the failure of an entire travel package. To deal
17The main elements that should be adopted as reference in the choice of the
threshold could be the time into the game. With the progress of the game, the
agent is more likely to relax ￿ (￿ ) in order to buy (sell) a good. In addition, the
risk attitude of the agent also has relation to the value of this threshold value.398 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 3, JUNE 2004
TABLE VIII
SIMILARITY FUNCTIONS OF FUZZY SETS FOR PRICE OF T/S
TABLE IX
SIMILARITY FUNCTIONS FOR FUZZY SETS OF PRICE CHANGE
with this complexity, several strategies are used: i) fuzzy rea-
soning to predict the likely clearing prices (see Section IV-C
for an evaluation of the prediction method); ii) “withdraw” non-
profitable hotel bids; and iii) reasoning to determine when to
switch between bidding for the different hotels. Each of them
are dealt with in turn.
1) FuzzyReasoningAboutHotelClosingPrices: According
to the basic laws of supply and demand theory [38], the higher
demand there is in a market, the higher the price of the goods.
Thusthecompetitionamongtheagentsonaparticularhotelauc-
tionleadstoariseinthepriceofthehotels.Forexample,T2and
T3 are in greatest demand, since staying in the good hotel gets
thehigherutilityandday2andday3arepartofmostcustomers’
stays. Therefore, their prices are always the highest. This infor-
mation,aswellasthepricechanges,arefactoredintotheagent’s
reasoning about price prediction. The reasoning utilizes fuzzy
rules to predict the clearing prices of hotels. The motivation for
usingfuzzyrulesisbasedonourpositiveexperiencesoftheiref-
fectiveness in other auction contexts [24], as well as their use in
otherdomainswherethereisaneedtocopewithuncertainties.18
Throughobservation,wefindthatthefactorsthateffecttheprice
of hotels are: The price of the hotel , the price of the coun-
terpart hotel , the price change in the previous minute
and the previous price change of the counterpart hotel (when it
closed) . Fig. 5 shows the relation between the closing of
several hotels in game tac2-5960. Here, S3 closes first (at the
4th minute). Then, the price for T3 rises very quickly because
S3s closure means some agents fail to get S3 and so they have
to bid in T3. Usually, the price of S2 is high, but since S2 closes
18Othermethodscouldalsohavebeenapplicableinthiscontext(see[31]fora
survey of uncertainty techniques in agent systems). However, fuzzy techniques
have proven to be successful in a wide range of practical domains where there
is a need to cope with uncertainties in a timely manner (see [12], [46], [53], and
[54] for some examples).
early, its price is relatively low. Also, the rooms of day 2 have a
close relationship with those of day 3 because many customers
stayforsuccessivedays.Thus,thepriceofT2alsorisesquickly.
To capture reasoning of this kind, we use the Sugeno
controller19 [45], [56], since it is easy to use and has already
shown to be effective in [24]. In more detail, the fuzzy
reasoning inference mechanism employed here adheres to
the fuzzy reasoning pattern shown in the equation at the
bottom of the page, where are fuzzy sets, and
are real numbers indicating the predicted price
increase. The output of the individual rule is denoted as
and - are
fuzzy parameters predefined by the designer.20
The firing level of the rules is computed by the
operator. That is,
(7)
where are the membership functions of
the corresponding fuzzy sets and , respectively. Ac-
cording to the Sugeno controller’s definition, the crisp control
action (i.e., the predicted increase of hotel closing price) of the
rule base is obtained by
(8)
19The use of other fuzzy logic controllers, such as the conventional Mamdani
controller [56] is also possible, and such of controllers could improve the per-
formance of our algorithms still further.
20These parameters are chosen based on the small or big values in the game
history and adapted based on the experience of the designer through experi-
ments.
if and and
. . .
if and and
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TABLE X
RESULT OF TAC-01
TABLE XI
RESULT OF TAC-02
When predicting the closing price of a hotel auction, three
casesareconsidered21:i)whenthegoodandbadhotelsareopen;
ii) when the counterpart hotel auction had just closed (within
the previous minute); and iii) when it had been closed for a
longer period of time. The corresponding rule bases are shown
in Tables V–VII.
Inthesetables,thehotelaskprices( and )areexpressed
in the fuzzy linguistic terms: very-high, high, medium, and low
[Fig. 6(a) and Table VIII] and the price changes ( and )
in the fuzzy linguistic terms quick, medium, and slow [Fig. 6(b)
and Table IX]. The output of the rule base is the prediction
of how much the price of the given hotel is likely to increase,
thus small, medium, big, very- is the increase that is
added to the current price to obtain the predicted clearing price.
2) Hotel Bid Withdrawal: Turning now to the notion of
withdrawing bids. TAC does not allow hotel bid withdrawal
during a game (as described in Section II). Nevertheless, our
agent can effectively achieve withdrawal by the following
means. The agent decides which bids to continue with, which
bids to withdraw and where new bids are needed based on
the output of the and . The
agent decides to withdraw a bid either because the hotel rooms
cannot be used or because the hotel price is predicted to rise
sharply. Suppose the current ask price of a hotel auction is
and our agent has already placed a bid higher than . The agent
calculates the predicted clearing price of each hotel auction
[from (8)]. The idea is that the agent submits a bid (for the
21SouthamptonTAC-01 used two rule bases to make its predictions: i) for
when both the good and bad hotels are open, and ii) for when the counterpart
auction was closed. However, we found that our predictions in the latter case
could be improved if we separated out the cases in which the counterpart auc-
tion had just closed (within the last minute) and when it had been closed for a
longer period of time. This difference occurs because hotel prices change more
rapidly and with a different pattern when the counterpart has just closed. When
the counterpart auction has been closed for a longer period, the changes are
smaller.
appropriate quantity) at the price of . In so doing, the agent
believes that new bids from other agents will top its withdraw
bid and, thus, will remove its commitment to those rooms. This
does not violate the rules of the TAC auction, but avoids getting
high price hotels. This method proved very effective and meant
our agent could withdraw bids before the ask price rose too
high. This ability to withdraw bids make it possible to consider
switching the bidding between the different hotel types (to be
discussed in Section III-G-III) and so increased the flexibility
of our bidding strategy.
3) Switching Between Hotels: SouthamptonTACs initial al-
location of hotel rooms starts early in the game, while the ask
pricesofallthehotelsareverylow.Atthistime,itusestherefer-
ence hotel prices as input to the . This reference price
comes from the average prices of the various hotels in previous
ten games. During the course of a game, it is sometimes useful
for an agent to change from trying to buy one sort of hotel to
going for another. However there are risks in this: i) it may fail
to get rid of its existing bids for its original hotels (thus it may
double bid); and ii) it is possible that the price of the hotel that
is changed to rises very quickly while the price of the old type
remains unchanged (thus, the agent may want to switch its bid-
ding back to its original hotel).
To manage the process of determining when to change the
typeofhoteltobidfor,ouragentemploysthefollowingprocess.
The output of the is an optimized solution which
means that if a new allocation (involving a different hotel) pro-
ducesone moreunitof profitthanthecurrentone, itwillbe sug-
gested. However, blindly following this recommendation may
cause the agent to oscillate in its behavior and lead it to having
unwanted hotel rooms at the end of the process. To avoid this,
our agent makes sure that any change in behavior is likely to
have a worthwhile effect on its score. In more detail, given a
change threshold , suppose a customer is currently allocated400 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 3, JUNE 2004
TABLE XII
EXPERIMENT SET-UPF O RCONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS.T HE LIGHT
GREY AREA INDICATES COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS AND DARK
GREY NON-COMPETITIVE ONES
to stay in Hotel giving it a utility of . Now assume the
suggests placing this customer in Hotel giving a
utility of (where ). The rule for enacting this de-
cision is: IF THEN change to ELSE
stay in , where indicates the loss if the agent cannot
withdraw its existing bids in hotel auction . Here, is the
quote price of auction and is the possibility of not with-
drawing the bid (this can be approximated from the speed with
which bids have changed in the last minute). Adhering to this
rule means we only withdraw those bids that have a continu-
ously changing bid history in the past minute and those where
much more profit can be obtained by changing the hotel type.
H. Varying the Bidding Strategy
After our experiences in TAC-01, we came to believe that
thereis nosingle best strategythat can deal withall thedifferent
typesofTACenvironment(seeSectionIVformoredetails).For
example, a risk-seeking agent that always allocates the optimal
travelpackageforitscustomersandbuysflightsearlierishighly
effective in noncompetitive environments. This is because there
is little competition in hotel bidding and the agent can always
obtain what it wants. On the other hand, delaying buying flights
and shortening the stay of customers works well in competitive
games. For this reason, SouthamptonTAC [21] dynamically
varies its bidding strategy according to its assessment of the
environment type (see Section IV-D for an evaluation of the
effectiveness of being able to do this). In games it deems
noncompetitive, SouthamptonTAC buys all of its flight tickets
at the beginning of the game and never changes the travel plan
of its clients (unless it senses a change in the environment). In
this way, it avoids buying extra hotels which cost extra money.
Also, the agent can receive optimal utility by not shortening
the stay of its customers. In competitive games, our agent
buys flights according to its assessment of the flight category
(as discussed in Section III-E). In these games the agent may
alter its customers’ travel plans in order to avoid staying in
expensive hotels for long periods. In semicompetitive games,
the agent behaves in between these two strategies; it buys
most of the flights earlier and will only change travel plans
if a significant improvement can be obtained.
IV. EVALUATION
Our evaluation of SouthamptonTAC is composed of two
components: i) the results from the TAC-01 and TAC-02 com-
petitions, and ii) our post-hoc systematic analysis in a range
of controlled environments.
A. TAC Results
TAC consisted of a preliminary round (mainly used for prac-
tice and fine tuning), a seeding round, the semi-finals and the
final round. The seeding round determined groupings for the
semi-finals. The top 16 agents were organized into two “heats”
for the semi-finals based on their position in the seeding round
andthefirstfourteamsinbothheatsenteredintothefinalround.
In TAC-01, SouthamptonTAC-01 obtained the highest score
in the seeding round [see Table X(a)]. Table X(b) shows the
result of the final round, here SouthamptonTAC-01 had the 3rd
highest score.22 Overall, during the course of the competition
some 600 games were played and SouthamptonTAC-01 had the
highest mean score and lowest standard deviation.
For TAC-02, Table XI(a) shows the seeding round result of
each agent’s relative score to SouthamptonTAC. Note there is
less than 2 points difference between ATTac and Southamp-
tonTAC and given the random features of the game their per-
formance should be considered as broadly similar. Table XI(b)
shows the scores (again relative to our agent) of all the agents
in this final round. Again, the difference between Southamp-
tonTAC and the top agent is small, less than 0.8% (when all the
games in the competition are considered, SouthamptonTAC is
2.2% better than whitebear).
When both competitions are considered, there are 12 agents
that participated in both TACs (some of the agents are designed
by the same group but with different agent names). Four of
these twelve qualified for the final rounds in both competitions.
For these four agents, their average scores over both competi-
tions (some 1200 games) are: SouthamptonTAC (3229), white-
bear (3119), livingagents (3016) and Thalis/CaiserSose (2863).
Thus, our agent is the most successful of these.
Throughbothcompetitions,webelievethatthislargenumber
of games and the very nature of the competition mean that
the difference in the trader’s scores reflect true differences in
the performance of the agents’ strategies. Thus, we believe
SouthamptonTAC performs successfully in a wide range of
TAC situations.
B. Controlled Experiments
Toevaluatetheperformanceofouragentinamoresystematic
fashion than is possible in the competition, we decided to run a
series of controlled experiments.23 To do this, we devised two
competitoragentsthatadoptstrategiesconsistentwiththebroad
classes of behavior that were observed in the competition.
• Risk-seeking agent (RS-agent) Based on the behavior of
the livingagents, UMBCTAC, and Walverine agents (see
22This score was calculated without game 7315, where there was a crash due
to the network platform failure for SouthamptonTAC. Details can be found in
http://auction2.eecs.umich.edu/tac01-scores-finals/.
23It is interesting to compare agents that use fuzzy sets with agents that use
fixed boundaries are the rules. However, we leave it as our future work.HE AND JENNINGS: DESIGNING A SUCCESSFUL TRADING AGENT 401
Fig. 7. Performance of SouthamptonTAC in different environments.
Section V for more details), this agent buys all the flights
tickets at the beginning of the game, bids aggressively in
hotel auctions and never changes the plans for its cus-
tomers.
• Risk-averse agent (RA-agent) Based on the behavior of
the SouthamptonTAC-01, Retsina, and sics agents (see
SectionVformoredetails),thisagentbuysasmallnumber
of flight tickets at the beginning of each game to leave
some flexibility for changing the customers’ travel plans
according to how the game unfolds.
For both these types of agents, as well as for Southamp-
tonTAC, a record is kept of the closing price history and the
initial travel plans for the customers are calculated based on the
average price of this history.
The setup of the experiment is shown in Table XII where
it can be seen that there are 36 different cases which cover
all possible combinations of SouthamptonTAC, RA-agents and
RS-agentsgiventhattherecanonlybeeightagentsinonegame.
Forexample,inthecasewherethenumberofRA-agentsis2and
the number of RS-agents is 1, there will be 5 SouthamptonTAC
agents. For each case, between 50–100 games24 were played to
test the performance of each kind of agent. In this way, it is pos-
sible to produce a wide range of environments, from competi-
tive to noncompetitive, and to evaluate the corresponding per-
formance of the different types of agents and thebroad behavior
trends. The following conjectures were used as an approximate
guide for designing the experiments.
Conjecture 1: The more RS-agents there are in the game,
the more competitive (see Section III-A) it will be and the
more RA-agents there are, the less competitive it will be.
Conjecture 2: RS-agents will do well in noncompetitive
environments and RA-agents will do well in competitive
ones.
24This number differs from game to game. The experiment for a single case
stops when the relative scores of the agents become stable.
In terms of Conjecture 1, the average hotel clearing price for
those environments marked as competitive (in Table XII) is 240
and for those marked as noncompetitive it is 67 and for the re-
mainder it is 125. Thus, Conjecture 1 can be seen to hold.
Wenowstarttoanalyzetheperformanceinthedifferentenvi-
ronments. Fig. 7 shows the performance surface of Southamp-
tonTAC in the different cases. The -axis and -axis represent
the number of RS-agents and RA-agents , thus,
the number of SouthamptonTAC agents is .
The -axis shows the average score25 of SouthamptonTAC. The
higher the score, the better the agent performs. Fig. 8 show the
performanceoftheRS-agentsandRA-agentsonsimilargraphs.
As shown in Fig. 7, SouthamptonTAC does best, obtains the
highest score, in competitive games (i.e., where the number
of RS-agents is big). This is due to the adaptive nature of
its strategy. When finding the game competitive, it alters its
strategy in the direction of being risk-averse. In noncompetitive
environments, it also does well since it adapts its strategy to bid
aggressively because it can always obtain the goods it wants.
Both of these observations are consistent with Conjecture
2. The worst situation for SouthamptonTAC is when all the
players are like itself. This is because the competitive tendency
of the agents causes the hotel prices to rise to moderate levels
and then many of the agents change their customers’ travel
plans at approximately the same time. This switching behavior
causes the counterpart hotel prices to rise (because of increased
competition) and the agents to have unused flights or hotel
rooms bought on account of their previous travel plans.26
For RS-agents, as shown in Fig. 8(a), the results also support
Conjecture 2. RS-agents behave very well in noncompetitive
25Suppose there are m SouthamptonTAC agents, and the average scores of
these agents are s ;s ;...;s . Then, the average score shown on the z-axis
is s =m.
26Theagentthatcanadaptitselfbesttothechangeofenvironmentwillsurvive
if there are other agents use similar strategies. Thus, the online parameter adap-
tation is important for the agent (more discussion can be found in Section VI).402 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 3, JUNE 2004
Fig. 8. Performance of different risk attitude agents in different environments.
games and their performance decreases rapidly as the number
of RS-agents increases. This happens because as more agents
bid aggressively, the hotel closing prices get higher. RA-agents
behave best in competitive environments when there are many
RS-agents, perform adequately in noncompetitive games
and worst in semi-competitive games when there are a few
RS-agents and SouthamptonTAC agents (see Fig. 8(b)). In
the latter two cases, RA-agents change their customers’ travel
packages reasonably often and this causes them to buy extra
hotels and flights that they cannot subsequently use.
Moreover, from Figs. 7 and 8, we find that the range of
scores for each kind of agent are different; for Southamp-
tonTAC it is , for RS-agents it is
and for RA-agents it is . Thus, the RA-agent has
the narrowest score range and is the most stable agent. The
RS-agent has the widest score range since its performance
depends heavily on the environment it is situated in. Southamp-
tonTAC is in between, less stable than RA-agents (but able to
obtain higher scores) but with a better worst performance than
RS-agents.
While Figs. 7 and 8 show the performance of a single
type of agent in various environments, Fig. 9 compares their
scores. There are 8 subfigures and each of them represents
several cases of the aforementioned experiments.27 We found
that when the number of SouthamptonTAC agents is small
27For example, in figure (c), there are 2 RS-agents, thus the horizontal axis
represents the number of RA-agents and the vertical axis is the average score of
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(less than 4), they can always outperform both RS-agents and
RA-agents [as shown in (e)–(h) and some cases in (a)–(d)].
This is because SouthamptonTAC can successfully adapt itself
in competitive games and become aggressive in noncompetitive
ones. However, as we discussed previously, when the number
of SouthamptonTAC agents is above 4, the agents exhibit
similar behavior and make the market less efficient. Generally,
from (a) to (h), it can also be seen that profits for all agent types
increase as the number of RA-agents increases (because these
agents keep the hotel prices low).
C. Predicting Hotel Prices
Most oftheagents inTACengage insome form ofhotel price
prediction (see Section V). Since, generally speaking, the more
accurately the agent can predict these prices the more easily it
can identify profitable actions. To this end, Table XIII shows
the accuracy of SouthamptonTAC’s predictions on a minute by
minute basis for a single game (randomly chosen) in the final.
The figures in the table are the difference between the predicted
price and the actual price. Thus, a positive number means over
prediction and a negative one means under prediction. As we
can see, the trend is that the further into the game the predic-
tions are made the more accurate they are. This is because at the
beginning the agent can only work based on the price history of
previous games. However as the game progresses, more infor-
mation is revealed (such as the closing order of the hotels, the
currenthotelpricesandtherelationbetweenthehotels).This,in
turn, means more accurate predictions can be made. This is im-
portantforouragentsinceitenablesitsflexibledecisionmaking
to be based on more or less accurate information.
Inmostcases,ouragenttendstooverpredictthehotelclosing
prices. If the hotel prices are not very high, the agent will not
suffersinceitwillnotchangetheplanforitscustomers;whereas
if the prices are very high, the agents may change the travel
plans for its customers and therefore obtain a lower score (since
it may have bought flights or rooms that it cannot now use).
However, when hotel prices rise very quickly, our agent tends
to under predict which can cause it to buy highly priced hotels
(so reducing its profit).
Furthermore, Table XIV shows the difference between the
predicted and actual hotel closing prices for the order in which
they closed in the final. For example, for the hotel that closed
first (whatever that happened to be in a particular game), the
average difference is 64, the maximum difference is 17428 and
the minimum is 8. These results are consistent with those of
Table XIII and show that the later a hotel closes, the more accu-
rate our agent’s prediction is.
D. Strategy Adaptation
To test the value of the agent being able to adapt its strategy
duringthecourseofagame,wecomparetheperformanceofour
agent with a nonadaptive variant (called na-SouthamptonTAC)
that is identical apart from the fact that it cannot change its
strategy once a game has started. In each game, there was one
28This number is large and it occurred at the beginning of the final where the
price history data was based upon the seeding round (which had very different
outcomes from the final round).
SouthamptonTAC, one na-SouthamptonTAC and the remaining
agents were drawn randomly from a pool of RS-agents and
RA-agents. We ran this configuration for 164 games and com-
putedtheaveragescoreofeachagenttype.Ourresultswerethat
the adaptive agent received an average score of 3138, the non-
adaptive one an averageof 2937 and the other agents an average
of 1657 (RS-agents) and 2649 (RA-agents). This shows that
being adaptive does indeed improve the agents’ performance.29
V. RELATED WORK
There are a number of strands of work thatare relatedto what
wehavedescribedinthispaper.First,thereistheworkonagents
bidding in multiple simultaneous auctions. Second, the work
usingfuzzytechniquestomanageanagent’sinteractions.Third,
alternatives to fuzzy reasoning for coping with the uncertainties
in bidding. Finally, other agents developed for the TAC. Each of
these is now dealt with in turn.
First, we consider bidding in multiple simultaneous auc-
tions. Preist designed an algorithm for agents that participate
in multiple English auctions [39]. The algorithm proposes a
co-ordination mechanism that can be used in cases where all
the auctions terminate simultaneously, and a learning method
to tackle auctions that are terminating at different times. How-
ever, their strategy is targeted at a single auction protocol
(English) and the goods are not inter-dependent. Byde also
describes a dynamic programming approach for agents that
participate in multiple English auctions to buy a single item
[5]. Moreover, in [4], the dynamic programming approach
is compared with other algorithms in order to determine its
quality. As a result, the dynamic programming approach is
shown to be effective. However this method is only for one
kind of auction (English) and it only deals with purchasing
one item. We also believe it is difficult to extend this approach
to a time constrained environment, such as the TAC, because
of the heavy computational demands of this technique.
Byde et al. framework [6] that enables an agent to make
rational decisions across multiple heterogeneous auctions
(English, Dutch, First-price sealed-bid, and Vickrey auctions).
It does this by using a fixed-auction strategy and a fixed
threshold strategy to estimate the expected utility of a bid,
and then exploiting a heuristic algorithm to approximate this
decision making behavior. However again there is no notion of
purchasing inter-related goods.
Anthony et al. [1] also propose an approach for agents to
bid for a single item in English, Dutch, and Vickrey auctions.
The agent decides what to bid based on four parameters: i) the
remaining time; ii) the number of remaining auctions; iii) the
desire for bargain; and iv) the desperateness of the agent. The
overallstrategyistocombinethesefourtacticsusingasetofrel-
ativeweightsprovidedbytheuser.Theagentalsohasadeadline
for obtaining the good, but only one item is purchased. In an ex-
tension to this model [2], a genetic algorithm is used to search
theeffectivestrategiessothatanagent canbehaveappropriately
accordingtoitsassessmentofitsprevailingcircumstances.Nev-
ertheless, it still does not deal with inter-related goods.
29A t-test showed that the adaptive agent’s performance is significantly better
than the nonadaptive one, where p<0:05.404 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 3, JUNE 2004
Fig. 9. Relative performance of the agents in different environments. SouthamptonTAC: —*—. RA-agent: —+—. RS-agent: —o—.
Combinatorial auctions do deal with inter-related goods in
that they allow bidders to bid for combinations of items. In
contrast with the multiple auctions scenarios above, however,
combinatrial auctions place the complexity on dealing with
the inter-related aspect of the bidding on the auctioneer rather
than on the bidding agent. Thus the auctioneer needs a winner
determination algorithm to select a set of nonconflicting bids
that maximize its revenue. This problem has been shown to
be NP-complete [15] and accordingly, a number of algorithms
havebeendevelopedtoachievethisaccordingtovariouscriteria
(e.g., anytime solutions [15], polynomial solutions [8], and
optimal solutions [40]).
We now turn to the use of fuzzy techniques to manage an
agent’s interactions. Faratin et al. [10] used fuzzy similarity to
compute tradeoffs among multiple attributes during bilateral
negotiations. An agent first generates some (all) of the potential
contracts for which it receives a score . Then, the agent
finds the contract on the indifference curve for which has
the maximum similarity degree to the last proposal from the
negotiation opponent. Here, fuzzy techniques are used to deal
with a bilateral negotiation and the algorithm aims to find a
TABLE XIII
ACTUAL VERSUS PREDICTED HOTEL PRICES.P OSITIVE FIGURE MEANS OVER
PREDICTION AND NEGATIVE FIGURE MEANS UNDER PREDICTION
TABLE XIV
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win–win (cooperative)solution forboth parties.Kowalczyk and
Bui [27], [28] modeled the multi-issue negotiation process as a
fuzzy constraint satisfaction problem (FCSP). Their approach
performs negotiation on individual solutions one at a time.
During negotiation, an agent evaluates the offers, relaxes the
preferences and constraints and makes counter-offers to find an
agreement for both parties. The issues negotiated over actually
correspond to the constrained variables and the preferences,
constraints and each party’s objectives are expressed as fuzzy
constraints over these issues. Using this method, the FCSP is to
find a solution that maximizes the satisfaction of all constraints
of the parties. Luo et al. [29], [30] developed a fuzzy constraint
based framework for bilateral multi-issue negotiations in semi-
competitive trading environments. The framework is expressed
via two knowledge models, one for the seller agent and one for
the buyer agent. The seller agent’s domain knowledge consists
of its multi-dimensional representation of the products or ser-
vices it offers. The buyer agent’s domain knowledge consists of
the buyer’s requirement/preference model (a prioritised fuzzy
constraint problem) and buyer’s profile model (fuzzy truth
propositions). The buyer and seller agents exchange offers and
counter-offers with additional constraints revealed or existing
constraints being relaxed. Finally, a solution is found if there
is one.
We also consider the alternatives to fuzzy reasoning for
handling uncertainty in agent interactions (see [32] for a com-
prehensivesurveyabouthandlinguncertaintyinagentsystems).
As stated, we chose fuzzy logic-based methods because they
have proven to be a practicable solution in solving decision
making problems under uncertainty. Fuzzy rules are the most
visible manifestation of this approach and have been success-
fully used in industrial applications, manufacturing, process
control, automotive control, and financial trading [54]. There
are, however, alternative techniques for handling uncertainty.
For example, the possibility-based approach [16], [34] has
been used to perform multiagent reasoning under uncertainty
for bilateral negotiations. In this paper, uncertainties due to the
lack of knowledge about other agents’ behaviors are modeled
by possibility distributions. Based on information from a case
base of previous negotiation behaviors, the possibility distri-
butions are generated by choosing the most similar situation
to the current context and the most similar price from the case
base. Since this approach relies on a case base, it is unclear
what would happen if no similar situations were available.
Moreover, even if a similar case exists, it is possible that the
strategy used successfully in that situation does not work in
the current environment due to the variety of competitors. The
Bayesian learning method [55] has also been used to explicitly
model multi-issue negotiation in a sequential decision making
model. In this paper, a Bayesian network is used to update the
knowledge and belief each agent has about the environment
and other agents, and offers and counter-offers between agents
during bilateral negotiations are generated based on Bayesian
probabilities. However, this method is inappropriate in our
context because assigning prior probabilities of a bid (ask)
being accepted is practically impossible given the dynamism
and uncertainty of the multiple auction context.
Finally,wediscussthemostsuccessfulagentsfrombothcom-
petitions in Table XV. ATTac uses machine learning techniques
to obtain a model of the price dynamics based on the past data
(e.g., the data in the seeding round) to predict the closing prices
of the hotels in the future. It also uses mixed-integer linear pro-
gramming(ILP) tofindtheoptimalallocationofthegoods[44].
cuhkagentiscomposedofacostestimator,anallocationandac-
quisition solver and bidders. It uses a greedy, heuristic search to
find the travel packages for customers. livingagents [14] bases
its decisions on closing price data for the various hotels in past
games and it buys all the flights needed at the beginning of the
game. It also buys/sells entertainment tickets at a fixed price of
80. It makes bids for the needed hotels only once during the
game again at a fixed price (of 1001). PainInNEC’s strategy
is a combination of heuristics and a genetic algorithm based
optimization method, which outputs the goods to buy and sell
given the predicted auction clearing prices and customers’ pref-
erences. Retsina uses a Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach to
allocate the goods to its customers and it uses a matrix learned
from past games to predict the hotel’s future prices. RoxyBot
[19] decides the goods to bid for based on heuristic search tech-
niques and applies a marginal utility calculator to determine
the value of the goods. sics uses pricelines for price predic-
tion and the optimizer performs branch-and-bound search for
thebestsolutions.UMBCTACbalancestheminimalriskandthe
maximum return to find the best travel plan for its customers.
Walverine [7] predicts the hotel closing prices by calculating
the Walrasian competitive equilibrium of the game. whitebear
[47] uses a randomised greedy algorithm to calculate the price
of each commodity bought or sold and uses Bayesian analysis
to compute the minimum and average value of the flight’s de-
terminant factor.
As seen from the aforementioned discussion, there are a
number of commonalities between thedesigns. Firstly, a variety
of AI techniques including fuzzy reasoning, machine learning,
planning, Markov decision making and heuristic search are
used for making predictions about the likely future state of
affairs. Thus, most agents keep a record of the hotel closing
prices and use a variety of methods to predict subsequent hotel
closing prices in order to allocate travel packages to customers.
Secondly, a number of the agents adapt their bidding behavior
in response to environmental changes. Such adaptation includes
our agent varying its bidding behaviors (as described in Sec-
tion III-H), ATTac which varies the number of flights it buys
at the beginning of the game, and whitebear which postpones
some flight ticket purchases until after it learns the hotel prices.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents a successful application of fuzzy set
theory in agent-mediated electronic commerce. It details the
design, implementation and evaluation of SouthamptonTAC;
an agent that successfully participated in both the TAC-01 and
the TAC-02 competitions and that employs a range of fuzzy
techniques at its core. Specifically, it uses fuzzy pattern recog-
nition to determine the type of environment it is situated in and
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depending on this assessment. In entertainment auctions, the
agent continuously observes the current market asks/bids and
uses fuzzy set techniques to extend the asks/bids it will accept
by decreasing the similarity degree of the fuzzy sets. Moreover,
the agent uses fuzzy reasoning techniques (Sugeno controller)
to predict the hotel closing prices given the prevailing market
conditions.
SouthamptonTAC has been shown to be successful across a
wide range of TAC environments (in both competitions as well
as in our controlled experiments). Naturally the strategies that
have been employed are tailored to the specific auction con-
text of the competition (as is any agent strategy for any other
auction context). Nevertheless, we believe that the TAC do-
main exhibits a number of characteristics that are common to
many real-world, online trading environments. These attributes
includeatimeconstrainedenvironment,networklatency,unpre-
dictable opponents, multiple heterogeneous auction types, and
the need to purchase inter-related goods. Given this, we believe
that a number of technologies and insights from our work are
applicableinabroaderagent-mediatede-commercecontextand
our future work aims to exploit these.
We start by considering the reusable technologies from our
work. First, our fuzzy reasoning methods for predicting hotel
closing prices can be reused in multiple auction applications in
which an agent tries to procure a good from a number inter-re-
lated auctions that are running concurrently. In such contexts,
the task for a bidder is to select one or more auctions in which
to bid. This procedure is usually based on a utility analysis so
that the auctions selected will maximize the utility of the bidder
(as in [6] discussed in Section V). However, in order to calcu-
late the utility, the likely clearing price of each auction must be
estimated first (which is where our fuzzy reasoning techniques
can be used). Due to the uncertainty of the context, it is difficult
to use a probability-based method to calculate the correlation
between auctions because assigning prior probabilities is often
impossible in practice in this context. However, our fuzzy rea-
soning is intuitive and its embodiment in fuzzy rules means that
it should be readily comprehensible to the agent’s designers (as
has happened in other similar applications of fuzzy rules [24],
[43], [52]). For example, when faced with multiple inter-related
auctions, the following factors can be used in the prediction
rules: the auction closing time, the goods purchased, the current
ask price of a given auction, the current winning bid and so on.
Secondly, our method for an agent assessing its environment is
applicableinmoregeneralsettings.Webelievethatwhenagents
have to use heuristic strategies it is likely that no one heuristic
is likely to be best for all cases. Therefore, such agents need the
abilitytotailortheirstrategyaccordingtotheirassessmentofthe
prevailing situation. Todo this theyneed to be able to determine
what environment they are in so that they can best respond. For
example, in the general case of multiple auctions, the environ-
ment sensor can work based on the previous clearing prices, the
type of participants in the auctions, the number of participants
in the auctions and so on. Thirdly, the strategy used in entertain-
ment bidding is applicable to any other type of CDA. In a CDA
where an agent submits both asks and bids, most agents calcu-
late an optimal bid price that can maximize its utility, and wait
for the bid to be matched by other agents (e.g., [17]). However,
the strategy employed by our agent uses the similarity in fuzzy
TABLE XV
COMPARISON AMONG AGENTS (RS MEANS RISK SEEKING,R AR ISK
AVERSE, AND RN RISK NEUTRAL (BETWEEN RS AND RA). “—” MEANS
INFORMATION UNAVAILABLE)
sets which allows a greater degree of flexibility in that it will
accept bids and asks if they are close enough to the optimal bid.
Now, we turn to the insights from this work that are more
broadly applicable. First, we believe that the uncertainty that is
inherent in most complex auction situations means that a bid-
ding agent needs to be able to adapt its behavior and strategy
during the course of its interactions. While attempting to settle
thesethingsinadvanceandnotrespondingtotheprevailingcon-
text may sometimes work (even in repeated encounters), it can
produce brittle behavior that is not robust in a wide variety of
circumstances. Nevertheless, some degree of prior analysis is
essential to set the basic parameters to approximately correct
valuesotherwisetheagentmaytakealongtimebeforeitstartsto
perform effectively. Thus, our agent was tuned between rounds
based on past performance and the risk attitude of its opponents
in the competition. This was possible because the opponents
wereknowninadvanceforthesemifinalsandfinalsandbecause
the opponents’ behaviors can be studied in previous rounds.
Second, the fuzzy technologies we developed for making pre-
dictions, assessing the prevailing context and adapting behavior
are computationally efficient and are able to operate with rela-
tively simple information that is likely to be readily available in
most trading contexts. Third, and most generally, effective and
robust behavior requires a detailed understanding of the space
of environmental possibilities and a careful evaluation of the
broad responses that are desirable in such cases. Having ob-
tained this, the specific behavior within such a framework can
then be fine-tuned using appropriate analysis and adaptive tech-
nologies. Fourth, while an agent should certainly be respon-
sive to its prevailing context; it should not respond to each and
every minor perturbation in the environment. For example, in
hotel bidding,the current ask prices of each auction change ona
minutebyminutebasis. Now,it maybe thattheagentbelievesit
can obtain an improvement in utility by switching its customers
between the good and the bad hotels. However, if this improve-
ment is only small then the agent should not switch because its
estimation is based on uncertain predictions and if these predic-
tions are slightly out then there may not be a real improvement.
Moreover, by making such a switch the agent is taking a risk
because it may not be able to off-load those hotels that it has al-
ready bought and so it may have to pay for hotels that it cannot
use.
Forthefuture,thereare some extensionsfor thismodel. First,
the pattern recognition procedure adopted to classify the envi-
ronment competitive degree could be enhanced by integrating
the decision process with further variables representative of theHE AND JENNINGS: DESIGNING A SUCCESSFUL TRADING AGENT 407
tradingevolution.Thisisaimedtodevelopamorerobustknowl-
edge base. Second, the membership function parameters need
to be adapted dynamically in order to address the inherent time
varying nature of trading applications. Here, fuzzy neural net-
work techniques seem appropriate.
APPENDIX
A. Setup for Allocator-1
• Notation: i) Let the 20 travel packages be described in
the following way: (outdate indate hotel-type), where
outdate indicating date out to Tampa;
indate indicating the date back to TACtown;
hotel-type where 0 stands for hotel and 1 for T
hotel. The 20 valid travel packages can be expressed as:
(1 2 1), (1 3 1), (1 4 1), (1 5 1), (2 3 1), (2 4 1),(2 5 1), (3
4 1), (3 5 1), (4 5 1), (1 2 0), (1 3 0), (1 4 0), (1 5 0), (2
3 0), (2 4 0), (2 5 0), (3 4 0), (3 5 0), and (4 5 0). ii) The
entertainment tickets have three types for four days. Let
(type day) denote a ticket, where type and day
. For each customer, various tickets can be
expressed as: (1 1), (1 2), (1 3), (1 4), (2 1), (2 2), (2 3),
(2 4), (3 1), (3 2), (3 3), and (3 4).
• Variables: i) For customer , there are 20
variables where , each rep-
resenting the th travel package. Customer is allocated
to package when . Thus, there are 160 vari-
ables for eight customers. ii) BUY BUY repre-
sent the inflight tickets to buy; BUY BUY rep-
resent the outflight tickets to buy; BUY BUY
represent the T rooms to bid for; BUY BUY
represent the S rooms to bid for. iii) For each customer
, there are 12 variables where
, each representing the th entertainment
ticket. Customer is allocated ticket when .
• Constants: Let OWN OWN be the inflight
tickets owned by the agent; OWN OWN
be the outflight tickets owned by the agent;
OWN OWN represent the T rooms owned by
the agent; OWN OWN represent the S rooms
owned by the agent; and OWN OWN denote
each kind of entertainment ticket owned by the agent.
• Constraints
i) The number of hotel rooms must be less than the
number of rooms the agent owns and that it will
bid for (eight constraints)
OWN BUY
OWN BUY
OWN BUY
OWN BUY
OWN BUY
OWN BUY
OWN BUY
OWN BUY
ii) For customer entertainment tickets
must be used between the days in Tampa (32
constraints)
iii) Each customer has only one valid
package (8 constraints), .
iv) For entertainment ticket the
number of tickets used must be less than the
number the agent owns (12 constraints):
OWN
v) Theflightsticketsthatcanbeusedmustbelessthan
the number the agent owns or that it will buy (eight
constraints)
OWN BUY
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OWN BUY
OWN BUY
OWN BUY
OWN BUY
OWN BUY
OWN BUY
vi) Forcustomer eachtypeofentertain-
ment ticket can only be used once (24 constraints):
• Objective function. The objective function is to maximize
the following formula:
BUY Price
where is the utility if customer chooses package ;
is the preference value if customer enjoys entertain-
ment ticket ; and Price is the updated ask price of the
corresponding auctions.
B. Setup for Allocator-2
• Variables (276 variables). The difference with allocator-1
is that there are no variables BUY BUY ,
since all the hotel auctions have closed. However,
BUY BUY , indicating the number of en-
tertainment tickets to buy for each of the 12 tickets, are
added.
• Constraints (92 constraints). All but the following are the
same as those of allocator-1: Constraints v) are changed to
OWN BUY
where . This means the allocator can also
calculate which entertainment tickets to bid for in order to
get the optimal utility. All the other constraints are the same
as allocator-1.
• Objectivefunction.Theobjectivefunctionistomaximizethe
following formula:
BUY BUY
where is theutilityif customer chooses package ;
is the preference value if customer enjoys entertainment
ticket ; and is the updated ask price
of the flight auctions and is the
entertainment ticket price in the corresponding auctions.
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